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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-3418
___________
CHOLO DONGON, 
Immigrant Green Card Holder, 
Permanent Resident of Hudson County, Jersey City, N.J.,
Appellant
v.
DONNA BANAR, A Permanent Resident Of The Philippines, Never Before The N.J.
Superior Court Hudson County, Nor Ever Ever In The United States;
N.J. SUPERIOR COURT, Hudson County; MAUREEN MANTINEO, Presiding Judge; 
JUDGE SEVERIANO LISBOA; NEW JERSEY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
COURTS; N.J. FAMILY SUPPORT, Division Of Trenton, New Jersey;  
N.J. SUPERIOR COURT, Appellate Division; JUDGE JOSEPH F. LISA, P.J.A.D.
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 2-08-cv-05331)
District Judge:  Honorable Faith S. Hochberg
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
November 25, 2009
Before:  MCKEE, RENDELL and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 25, 2010)
_________
OPINION
_________
 The District Court did not address Appellees’ argument that Dongon’s complaint1
is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and because of the domestic relations exception
to federal jurisdiction.
2
PER CURIAM
Cholo Dongon appeals pro se from a District Court order dismissing his action. 
For substantially the same reasons, we will affirm.
In October 2008, Dongon filed a complaint in which he moved for damages and a
protective order against various courts and judges in the state of New Jersey, who he
believed had denied him due process of law and committed fraud against him.  Dongon’s
claims stem from an underlying family matter in which the state court imposed and
affirmed a child support obligation on him as a New Jersey resident.  Dongon argued that
the actions taken by the state courts and judges violated his constitutional rights, were
without jurisdiction, and requested that the federal court intervene.  He also named Donna
Banar, a private citizen, in his suit.
Appellees filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and argued
that Dongon’s complaint revealed no allegations of fact or legal theory that would support
any of the claims asserted against the defendants.  The District Court agreed, finding that
Dongon’s claims for rulings issued by judges and courts in underlying family matters in
state court were barred by absolute judicial immunity, quasi-judicial immunity, and
Eleventh Amendment immunity.    In addition, the District Court ruled that because one1
3defendant is a private citizen and not a state actor, she cannot be subject to liability under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Dongon timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We will summarily affirm if
Dongon’s appeal presents no substantial question.   See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and 3d Cir.
I.O.P. 10.6.  Our review is plenary.  See Miller v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 475 F.3d 516,
519 (3d Cir. 2007).  Dismissal is proper if a party fails to allege sufficient factual matter,
which if accepted as true, could “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  
Dongon’s action was properly dismissed because he cannot receive the relief he
requests.  He cannot sustain a claim against Judges Mantineo, Lisboa, and Lisa because
judges are entitled to absolute immunity from liability based on actions taken in their
official judicial capacity.  Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334 (1983) (citing Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).  Dongon’s
allegations that these judges committed “willful fraud” are unsupported, and his
disagreement with the judges’ rulings do not provide a basis for relief. 
Similarly, Dongon’s claims against New Jersey Family Support Division; the
Superior Court of New Jersey; New Jersey Administrative Office of Courts; and the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division were properly dismissed.  Dongon does
not allege any specific action by these entities.  Even if he did, any actions taken by those
4charged with the responsibility of carrying out a court’s order would be barred by the
doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity.  See Gallas v. Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 772-73 (3d Cir. 2000).  Alternatively, the state courts, its
employees, and the judges are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment
because they are part of the judicial branch of the state of New Jersey, and therefore
considered “arms” of the state.  See Johnson v. State of N.J., 869 F. Supp. 289, 296-98
(D.N.J. 1994).  
Moreover, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a
violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the
alleged deprivation was committed by a “person” acting under color of state law.  West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).  Neither the named judges nor the courts or its employees
are “persons” subject to liability under § 1983.  See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).  The remaining defendant, Donna Banar, is a private citizen and
not a state actor, and therefore cannot be subject to liability under § 1983.  We also
conclude that Dongon’s general allegations that his constitutional rights were violated fail
to state a claim for relief.  To the extent that errors of state law have occurred, even if
true, these claims do not amount to a denial of due process warranting federal court
intervention.  See Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 731 (1948); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.
107, 121 & n.21 (1982).    
Although the District Court did not address whether Dongon’s complaint can be
5construed as a request for injunctive relief, even if it were, the Younger abstention
doctrine applies.  The Supreme Court has articulated a longstanding public policy against
federal court interference with state court proceedings and instructs federal courts to
refrain from taking any action in cases where the federal plaintiff has or had adequate
redress in state proceedings.  Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).  Because it
appears that state court proceedings are pending or ongoing in Dongon’s child support
matter, it would be inappropriate for this Court to interfere with the state’s interest in
administering its own family court.  See Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d
181, 192 (3d Cir. 2006). 
Accordingly, because dismissal was proper and because the appeal presents no
substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court judgment.  Appellant’s
remaining motions are denied as moot.
